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ABSTRACT. The purpose of this study was to determine whether there is a relationship
between pre-service science teachers’ Field Dependent or Field Independent (FD/FI) cognitive
styles and the application of degrees of naive impetus theory. The sample consisted of 122 pre-
service science teachers (97 females and 25 males) who were enrolled in the Introductory
Physics course required by the Science Education program. Data were collected in two
successive years, after the completion of the required Introductory Physics undergraduate
courses, in 2008 and 2009. The Group Embedded Figure Test and Impetus Theory
Application Test (a two-tier-type test) were administered to assess the FD/FI tendency of
students and to determine the degree students applied the naïve impetus theory, respectively.
Initial results showed that a majority of students had made use of the native impetus theory
repeatedly. The results also indicated that the degree to which students applied the naïve
impetus theory was statistically related to their FD/FI cognitive styles. The findings of this
research showed that there existed a statistically significant difference between the FI and FD
students’ degree of applying the naïve impetus theory in favor of FI students. However, the test
score gap between FI and FD students remained almost constant regardless of the testing
instruments utilized in this study.
KEY WORDS: field independent/field dependent cognitive styles, naïve impetus theory,
pre-service science teachers
INTRODUCTION
Studies in science education have indicated that students’ conceptions about
science often differ from the currently accepted scientific views. These ideas
are commonly labeled as alternative conceptions (Clement, 1993;
McDermott, 2001, Young-Jin, 2011). Some of these alternative concepts,
as wrong as they are, exhibit a well-developed thinking structure, frequently
grounded in everyday experiences. These misconceptions mainly originate
from students’ experience with the real world: they also provide viable and
logical explanations for daily tasks. Another important source of students’
alternative concepts comes from teachers who themselves exhibit similar
alternative concepts and reflect these in their teaching. Additionally,
textbooks have been reported as another important source of alternative
concepts, especially when inadequate analogies and/or models are utilized to
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present the learning material (Driver, Guesne & Tiberghein, 1985). Research
has shown that students’ alternative concepts can be very resistant to change
and they also hinder meaningful learning of the correct scientific concepts
(McDermott, 2001). For this reason, it is very important for science educators
to learn about common alternative concepts that students have in science.
In recent years, many studies have been conducted to determine
students’ conceptual understanding and alternative concepts of specific
topics in Physics, ranging from the simple notions treated in primary
school science courses to the more sophisticated subjects addressed in
calculus-based physics courses (Driver et al., 1985; Hestenes et al., 1992).
McDermott (2001) has summarized findings of major studies conducted
on students’ conceptual understanding of physics concepts. Some of these
can be classified as follows: (1) regardless of age and grade level,
students have alternative conceptions; (2) university and high-school
students have similar alternative conceptions; (3) alternative conceptions
hinder meaningful learning; (4) traditional teaching methods do not foster
meaningful learning; (5) traditional end-of-the-chapter-type problems are
not sufficient to assess conceptual understanding; and (6) employing
instructional strategies involving inquiry and/or conceptual change
activities proved to be more promising in terms of helping students to
construct scientific understanding of physics concepts.
Student understanding of key concepts on force and motion has also
been extensively studied. The research has revealed that students hold
many alternative conceptions and, hence, have difficulties in understand-
ing the scientific concepts of force and motion. The literature indicates
that students have the following major alternative conceptions regarding
force and motion: motion implies force, confusion between position and
velocity, confusion between velocity and acceleration, heavier objects fall
faster, action–reaction pairs act on the same object, the dominance idea,
and impetus theory (Hestenes et al., 1992).
STUDIES ABOUT NAÏVE IMPETUS THEORY
Students’ understanding or conceptualization regarding motion has
received widespread attention in experimental psychology and physics
education studies (Franco, 2004; Liu and MacIsaac, 2005; Kozhevnikov
& Hegarty, 2001; Hubbart, 2006, Franco, Muis, Kendeou, Ranellucci,
Sampasivam & Wang, 2012). A number of studies in the field of
cognitive psychology have dealt with human perception as it relates to an
object’s movement. Results of these studies might provide further
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explanations of students’ strongly held ideas about the impetus theory.
These studies check students’ responses on a memory task, which is
accomplished by subconscious processes and based on an implicit
perceptual knowledge of motion (Hubbart, 1993; Kozhevnikov &
Hegarty, 2001; Hubbart, 2006). The implicit perceptual knowledge of
motion takes place through a continuous mental manipulated process
known as “memory shift”. The magnitude and direction of this memory
shift is influenced by a number of factors. These factors have been listed
as follows: velocity, trajectory, shape of object, context (i.e. frame of
reference, moving or stationary background, and relative velocity), the
period of discrepancy of the object and probing of a remembered location,
and schematically proper ending and coherence of inducing a sequence
(Hubbart, 1993; Kozhevnikov & Hegarty, 2001).
Kozhevnikov & Hegarty (2001) have summarized the major findings of
these studies as follows. If a person views an object undergoing implied or
apparent motion and the object suddenly disappears, memory for that
object’s final position is shifted forward in the direction of motion. They also
summarized the general conclusion of these studies that the perceptual
system embodies a principle analogous to physical momentum such as the
continuing movement of an object until acted upon by a force. This
phenomenon has been labeled as Representational Momentum (RM).
According to results of RM research, there is not one unified understanding
of the concept about motion, but rather we operate in a two-dimensional
realm when dealing with motion: implicit perceptual knowledge of motion
and explicit naïve verbal-cognitive concepts of motion.
Our implicit perceptual knowledge of motion resembles the historical
impetus theory. RM research has also gathered evidence that an
individual’s implicit perceptual knowledge of motion may be “cognitively
impenetrable”. This last finding is in accordance with the numerous
results of Physics Education Research (PER) and provides yet another
explanation of why the impetus theory is heavily resistant to change.
On the other hand, a number of PER studies have examined and tried
to explain students’ responses based on a series of tasks where students
were required to explicitly explain an object’s trajectory of its motion.
The results provided evidence that students mostly used the impetus
theory to explain object motion. A general conclusion of PER studies on
object motion is that many students hold alternative conceptions that are
similar to the impetus theory. In particular, students think that a force
applied to an object gives it an internal force (impetus) that serves to
maintain the motion after the actual force has been withdrawn. Some
students think that the internal force (impetus) dissipates over time due to
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the resistance of the medium causing the object to come to rest (Clement,
1981; Halloun & Hestenes, 1985; Franco, 2004; Liu & MacIsaac, 2005).
Studies conducted on students’ alternative conceptions about force and
motions have given clear evidence that students’ explanations about motion
are complex in nature and have similarities with the impetus theory (Trumper
& Gorsky, 1996; Kurger, Palacio & Summers, 1992; Bogdanov & Viiri,
1999; Franco, 2004; Liu &MacIsaac, 2005; Bayraktar 2009). One of the first
studies on students’ utilization of impetus theory was conducted by Clement
(1981). He provided strong evidence on the pervasiveness of this belief.
More than 90 % of the 150 college students that took part in this study used
“invented forces” as the researchers named it (i.e. impetus) to describe the
motions of a coin tossed into the air, and a rocket drifting in space from point
A to B, and then a constant force acting on it until point C where afterward
this force was withdrawn. A study (Kurger, Palacio & Summers, 1992)
conducted on British primary school teachers’ understanding of the concept
of motion and force showed similar findings. Ninety-one percent of the
teachers involved in the study believed in and used the impetus theory, rather
than using Newton’s Laws to explain the objects’ motions. Furthermore,
most of the teachers could not differentiate between force and momentum.
Liu & MacIssac (2005) conducted a study on 614 university students
registered in a calculus-based physics course. An important finding, as far as
students’ impetus theory was concerned, showed that students’ impetus
theories were independent of their academic achievement, the familiarity of
the context, and the format of the questions. Bayraktar (2009) provides
further findings regarding 79 Turkish pre-service physics teachers’ alterna-
tive conceptions. Her study also showed that students made use of impetus
theory to explain the motion of an object. She reported that about 70% of the
students believed that a force was supplied through a “hit” and responsible
for the object’s motion afterward. Fifty-six percent of the students thought
that an object could lose or gain impetus depending on the kind of interaction
of the object with its surrounding, and 43 % of the students explained a
continual circular motion using the impetus notion. In summary, the use of
the impetus theory was very widespread among students and seemed to be
cross-cultural and gender independent.
STUDIES ABOUT FIELD INDEPENDENT/FIELD DEPENDENT COGNITIVE STYLES
Cognitive styles, i.e. preferred ways of selecting, perceiving, and
processing new information, have been an active research area in science
education (Witkin & Goodenough, 1981; Johnstone & Al-Naeme, 1991;
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Ates & Cataloglu, 2007a, b). The general intent of cognitive style
research is to identify and classify students’ cognitive structures, compare
them with the intended academic performance of students, and match
them with instructional methods to better individualize learning.
The concept of cognitive style is about the idea of psychological
differentiation, the root of which lies in the fact that individual’s
perceptions are affected by the surrounding conceptual field. This
psychological differentiation is referred to as field independence and
field dependence (Jonassen & Grabowski, 1993, p488). Individuals that
can easily break up an organized field and separate relevant information
from its context or discern a “signal” (what matters) from “noise” (the
incidental and peripheral) in a confusing background are defined as FI
(Witkin & Goodenough, 1981). Individuals that show difficulties in
separating an item from its context are defined as field dependent (FD).
Occasionally, FD/FI is also referred to as the global versus the articulated
cognitive style (Jonassen & Grabowski, 1993, p. 488). Basically, FI
learners perceive and process information analytically, while FD learners
do it in a global and passive way. Findings of previous studies indicated
that learners who show greater FD were attentive to contextual and social
information in the learning situation and tended to be responsive to the
introduction of external reinforcement, either material or social. On the
other hand, learners who could be categorized as FI tended to impose
their own analytical structure on ambiguous material and ignored external
influences (Witkin, Goodenough, Moore & Cox, 1977; Frank, 1984).
The correlation between cognitive style and academic performance in
various fields of science has been widely studied (Tinajero & Paramo,
1997; Gray, 1997; Ziane, 1996; Johnstone & Al-Naeme, 1991; Ates and
Cataloglu, 2007a, b). The results mostly indicate that FI students score
equally or higher than FD students in most of the academic fields. In the
field of physics education, a few studies have been conducted to
determine a possible relationship between cognitive style and physics
achievement (Ziane, 1996; Karacam, 2005; Ates & Cataloglu, 2007a).
Ziane (1996) found that cognitive styles of students play an essential role
in students’ success in physics and FI physics students obtained higher
scores in solving physics problems than the students who have a FD
cognitive style. Karacam (2005) investigated the possible correlations
between assessment techniques and conceptual understandings of the
basic concepts of force and motion of high schools students with respect
to different cognitive styles. In this study, students’ conceptual un-
derstandings were assessed using three different test techniques (i.e.
multiple-choice test, open-ended questions, and structural communication
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grids). The results of the study showed that there was a statistically
significant difference between FI and FD students’ conceptual under-
standing levels when assessed through multiple-choice test techniques,
whereas the effect of students’ cognitive styles of being field dependent/
field independent had no effect on the conceptual understanding level of
students, using open-ended tests and structural communication grids
techniques. Ates & Cataloglu (2007a) investigated the possible relation-
ship between students’ FI/FD cognitive styles, problem-solving skills, and
conceptual understandings in the area of force and motion. They found a
statistically significant relationship between cognitive style and students’
physics achievements. The findings of this research also illustrated that
the relationship between cognitive style and students’ physics achieve-
ments depended upon the operational definition of “physics achieve-
ment”. They also showed that there exists a statistically significant
difference between the FI and FD students’ problem-solving skills in
favor of FI students, but there was no statistically significant difference
established between the groups for conceptual understanding.
PURPOSES OF THE STUDY
Most often physics teachers and researchers assess students’ conceptual
understandings either with the quantitative end of the chapter/unit problems
found in common physics textbooks or multiple-choice tests developed by
researchers. If students score relatively highly on these tests, it is assumed
that the students had achieved a satisfactory level of understanding of the
concepts presented in that course. However, a well-known study established
that a high scoring student might still “lack” the desired understanding of
fundamental concepts in physics. Therefore, one can claim that being able to
solve standard problems in physics is not a true measure of the level of
conceptual understanding (Clement, 1993; McDermott, 2001).
However, recent studies also showed that physics achievement and
conceptual understandings of students depended upon several other
factors, such as an operational definition of “physics achievement”,
assessment techniques, the types of problems, format of test techniques,
and the context of the questions used in the research (Shepardson &
Pizzini, 1994; Sencer & Eryilmaz, 2004; Karacam, 2005; Ates and
Cataloglu, 2007a, b; Lawson et al., 2000). Clearly, the format of the
assessment instrument affects the outcome.
Obscure problems with irrelevant information put FD students in a
disadvantageous situation and will not contribute to furthering their
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understanding of the subject. Consequently, researchers need to explore
alternative testing techniques regarding students’ conceptions or alterna-
tive conceptions. Therefore, by using only the results of a multiple-choice
test to determine students’ alternative conceptions, we might run into the
risk of attributing or labeling FD students as having alternative concepts
while they might have had, for example, contextual problems.
If this is the case, then studies about determining a student’s tendency
for using the naïve impetus theory and a possible relationship between
their cognitive style and conceptual understanding, which were previously
determined by using a multiple-choice test, need to be reconsidered.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The following research questions framed this study:
1. Is there a difference between FI and FD students in their degree of
applying the naïve impetus theory when assessed using a two-tier test?
2. Is there a difference between FI and FD students in their degree of
applying the naïve impetus theory when assessed through only a
multiple-choice test?
3. Is there an interaction effect between assessment techniques and
cognitive styles of students in their degree of applying the naïve
impetus theory?
METHODOLOGY
The Sample
The sample consisted of 122 freshmen and sophomore (97 females and 25
males) students enrolled in an introductory university physics taught for
science teaching majors during the fall semesters of the first year of the
undergraduate program at Abant Izzet Baysal University (AIBU) in Turkey.
Procedure
This research study was done over two successive years. After completing
the introductory university physics course in the fall semesters (the years
of 2008 and 2009), all students were administered the Group Embedded
Figure Test (GEFT) and the Impetus Theory Application Test (ITAT) to
assess the FD/FI tendency of students and determine the degree students
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applied the naïve impetus theory, respectively. The course was mostly
traditional in format, having lectures, discussions, and solving standard
end-of-chapter problems, but different teaching/learning techniques (i.e.
analogies, inquiries, and conceptual change texts) were used a few times
during the semesters to enhance teaching and learning. One of the
researchers taught the course to all groups. He has approximately 20 years
of teaching experience in high school and university-level introductory
physics courses and contemporary courses in science education.
Instrumentation
The Group Embedded Figures Test (GEFT). The field dependent or field
independent (FD/FI) tendencies of students were measured by using several
instruments such as the Road and Frame Test, the Body Adjustment Test, and
the Group Embedded Figures Test. All of these instruments involve the dis-
embedding of a shape from its surrounding field. In this study, the Group
Embedded Figures Test (GEFT) was used to determine students’ levels of
field dependency. The GEFT was devised and calibrated by El-Banna (1987)
fromWitkin’s original tests materials (Witkin et al., 1977). Several researchers
have used the GEFT and its validity and reliability has been established
(Johnstone &Al-Naeme, 1991). The procedure for the Turkish translation and
its related validity and reliability study has been reported in a previous study
(Ates & Cataloglu, 2007a). The instrument includes 20 complex figures. It
requires the students to recognize and identify a hidden simple shape in each
of the set of complex figures. The students are required to outline it by pen or
pencil on the lines of the complex figure. Before starting the test, students were
briefed about the testing procedure and given 15 min to complete the test.
Finding a correct shape embedded in a complex figure is scored one (1) point,
and thus scores can range from 0 to 20. The students who can correctly find
more hidden figures are found to be better at the process of separation of a
figure from a confusing background and are classified as being field
independent (FI), and vice versa for being field dependent (FD). There is, of
course, a continuum between these two extremes, and those of intermediate
ability are classified as field intermediate (FINT).
El-Banna’s formula was used to classify students as being FD, FINT,
and FI (El-Banna, 1987). According to the researcher, students who
scored more than one quarter of a standard deviation (SD) above the
mean score were classified as FI, while students who scored under one
quarter of a SD below the mean score were classified as FD, and between
a score of plus or minus one quarter of a SD around the mean were
considered as FINT. In this study, the same formula was used to classify
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students (El-Banna, 1987; Alamolhodaei, 1996; Ates & Cataloglu,
2007a).
The Impetus Theory Application Test (ITAT). Recognizing the importance
of students’ understanding of the basic concepts in physics leads to
developing valid and reliable instruments for assessing the conceptual
understanding of students. Several tests, universal in the sense that they are
limited to concepts that are addressed in introductory mechanics, were
developed to assess students’ conceptual understanding (Hestenes et al.,
1992; Hestenes and Wells, 1992; Thornton and Sokoloff, 1998). The Force
Concept Inventory (FCI), a very well-known and widespread multiple-
choice instrument, was developed by Hestenes et al. (1992) to identify most
common alternative conceptions and assess student understanding of the
basic concepts in mechanics. The authors claim that the questions on the FCI
were designed to be meaningful to students without formal training in
mechanics to determine their preconceptions about Newton’s Laws. Most of
the multiple-choice distracters in the FCI are commonsense alternatives.
Another important criterion while developing the FCI was that it should
assess student understanding of the basic concepts in mechanics. The FCI is
a popular instrument in physics education as it has been given to thousands
of students at various levels (Hake, 1998). Hestenes et al. (1992) reported a
taxonomy of commonsense alternative conceptions probed by the FCI. The
taxonomy lists 28 distinct alternative conceptions along with corresponding
inventory items that suggest their presence when selected. They have been
grouped into six major commonsense categories such as kinematics,
impetus, active force, action/reaction pairs, etc. In the impetus category,
Hestenes et al. (1992) reported that impetus is perceived by students as an
inanimate “motive power” or “intrinsic force” that keeps objects moving,
which contradicts Newton’s First Law. Evidence that students believe in
some kind of impetus is therefore evidence that Newton’s First Law is not
fully understood. They also listed the distracters of the FCI items indicating
the application by novices of the naïve impetus theory. There are 13 items
related to the naïve impetus theory in the FCI.
As stated earlier, the purpose of this study was to assess students’
conceptual understanding about motion, with a special emphasis on
students’ application levels of the naïve impetus theory. Since the format
is affecting the outcome, the researchers have developed and used two-
tier tests to explore students’ application levels of the naïve impetus
theory in the present study. The use of two-tier tests allows teachers and
researchers to not only understand students’ conceptions or alternative
conceptions but also to explore students’ reasoning behind these ideas.
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Moreover, it facilitates assessment of alternative conceptions of a larger
number of students in a more efficient and relatively easy way (Treagust,
1986; Odom & Barrow, 1995).
Hence, we devised a new instrument that purposefully questions the
application level of the naïve impetus theory. We used the Force Concept
Inventory (FCI) and Mechanics Baseline Test (MBT) (Hestenes & Wells,
1992) as our sources for constructing the Impetus Theory Application
Test (ITAT). ITAT is a five-item two-tier test. Three of these questions
were originally taken from FCI and the remaining two from MBT (see
Appendix). Hence, ITAT inherits its content validity through FCI and
MBT, described in the following section in some detail, and its reliability
through a pilot study conducted on a sample of 152 pre-service science
education teachers.
(a) Validity—Rational
For items of the ITAT, the Turkish version of the FCI and the MBT were
used. Both the FCI and the MBT were translated and adapted into Turkish
by Cataloglu (1996) and by Ates & Cataloglu (2007a), respectively. The
FCI utilized in this study has a published alpha reliability coefficient of
0.89 and a mean item difficulty of 0.35. The MBT has a published alpha
reliability coefficient of 0.70 and a mean item difficulty of 0.42.
Additional evidence of validity can be provided through the correlation
between the item scores of ITAT, FCI, and MBT. The FCI and MBT are
extensively utilized instruments in our own teaching (Ates & Cataloglu,
2007a, b). We found a correlation coefficient of 0.71 between previously
administered FCI andMBT items as they related to ITAT. The resulting two-
tier test had five items assessing the application of the naïve impetus theory.
Both the FCI andMBT tests are multiple-choice-type instruments. However,
the ITAT (a modified two-tier test) measures students’ understanding not
only by distracter choice but also asks for further written explanations about
students reasoning in choosing a particular answer. On the ITAT, there are
five items related to the naïve impetus theory.
(b) Reliability
The following procedure was employed to determine the reliability of ITAT.
First, a pilot study was conducted in the academic year of 2007. One hundred
fifty-two pre-service science education teachers took part at the initial version
of ITAT. The initial version consisted of six questions. Four of those questions
were originally taken from FCI and the remaining two from MBT. Tables 1
and 2 show the statistical results of the pilot and final version of ITAT.
The initial results were promising, as the Cronbach alpha reliability was
0.79 for tier one (the multiple-choice part) and 0.69 for tier two. Both
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values were satisfactory and well within the acceptable range. The test
had a moderate difficulty level (0.56 and 0.43). However, when further
analysis was conducted per item, we observed that question number 2 was
somewhat problematic (see table below).
As can be seen from Table 2, question 2 had a low itemmean difficulty value
of 0.16 and an associated relatively high standard deviation—clearly an
outlier, hence leading us to conclude that this particular itemwas problematic.
After conducting informal interviews with selected students, we came to the
conclusion that this question was not well understood by the students. As a
result, we opted to disqualify item number 2 from ITAT. Hence, the final
version of ITAT is now made up of five questions. Table 1 shows the
statistics of the final version of ITAT on the same sample without question
number 2. Although the Cronbach alpha reliability coefficient remained the
same (largely due to a large sample size), the average item difficulty
TABLE 1
Statistical results of the pilot study and final version for the ITAT
Statistics
Values for pilot study Values for final version
Multiple choice Two-tier Multiple choice Two-tier
N 152 152 152 152
Mean 3.36 2.61 3.14 2.44
SD 1.9 1.6 1.7 1.6
SEM 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.13
Range 0–6 0–6 0–5 0–5
Reliability 0.79 0.69 0.79 0.67
Average point–biserial correlation 0.68 0.61 0.74 0.65
Average difficulty index 0.56 0.43 0.62 0.49
TABLE 2
Descriptive statistics for the ITAT items
Question# n Min Max Mean SD
Q1 152 0 1 0.51 0.50
Q2 152 0 1 0.16 0.37
Q3 152 0 1 0.34 0.47
Q4 152 0 1 0.51 0.50
Q5 152 0 1 0.50 0.50
Q6 152 0 1 0.60 0.49
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decreased from 0.56 to 0.62 for tier one and 0.43 to 0.49 for tier two, resulting
in a more balanced test with respect to items that make up the test.
(c) Scoring
The scoring procedure of the ITAT was as follows: students were
instructed to respond by checking the answer they thought was correct on
the multiple-choice part and then provide a written rationale on their
answer explaining their reasoning. If both the responses on the multiple-
choice part and related explanations involved the application of the naive
impetus theory, then we coded them as “1”. The responses and
explanations which involved partial or non-naive impetus theory were
coded as “0”. Students’ scores ranged from 0 to 5. Accordingly, the
overall mean score for the test represents the naïve impetus theory
application degree of students.
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
The Group Embedded Figures Test (GEFT) scores were analyzed to
determine the FD/FI tendencies of students. The mean score of the
students for the GEFT was 12.26 with a standard deviation of 4.01. The
formula mentioned in the previous section was used to classify students as
being FD, FINT, or FI. According to this analysis, 56 students (46 %) scored
between 0 and 11, 13 students (11 %) scored 12 or 13, and 53 students
(43 %) scored between 14 and 20, and they were classified as FD, FINT, and
FI, respectively. The percentages for the corresponding classifications of
primary teaching department students in the same university were 40 %,
17%, and 43% (Ates & Cataloglu, 2007a). Hereafter, as reported earlier, the
students classified as field intermediates (FINT) based on the scores in the
GEFT were ignored to expose the extremes.
Results on Research Question 1
ITAT scores were analyzed to compare the groups’ (FD and FI students)
responses and mean scores for the degree of applying the impetus belief
by using the two-tier test technique. ANOVA techniques were used to
determine if the mean scores of the groups differed statistically. A
summary and descriptive statistics for these analyses are presented in
Tables 3 and 4, while an ANOVA table for ITAT mean scores by
cognitive style is shown in Table 5.
FD and FI students’ responses for each item of the ITAT were explored.
As can be seen from Table 3, overall 54 % of the students applied the naïve
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impetus theory as measured by using the two-tier test technique. Sixty-one
percent of FD students applied the naïve impetus theory, while only 46 % of
FI students applied the naïve impetus theory. The effects of FD and FI
cognitive styles on students’ mean scores for applying the naïve impetus
theory in problem solving were also examined (Table 4). The FD students’
mean score for the ITAT was 3.07 with a standard deviation of 1.3. The FI
students’ mean score was 2.32 with a standard deviation of 1.5. The
ANOVA results shown in Table 5 indicate that there was a statistically
significant difference between FD and FI students in their degree of applying
the impetus theory in favor of FI students.
TABLE 3
Summary statistics of students’ responses to the ITAT by cognitive styles
Questions
Cognitive
style
% of students’ responses
assessed by two-tier
% of students’ responses
assessed by multiple choice
%
Misconception
% Total
misconception
%
Misconception
% Total
misconception
Q1 FD 68 56 75 66
FI 43 57
Q2 FD 48 38 54 43
FI 26 32
Q3 FD 59 56 93 84
FI 53 75
Q4 FD 61 53 77 72
FI 45 66
Q5 FD 71 68 86 83
FI 64 81
Overall FD 61 54 77 70
FI 46 62
TABLE 4
Descriptive statistics of ITAT scores by groups
Test techniques Cognitive styles N Mean SD
Two-tier test FD 56 3.07 1.3
FI 53 2.32 1.5
Multiple choice test FD 56 3.84 1.2
FI 53 3.11 1.5
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Results on Research Question 2
As mentioned in the “Instrumentation” section, the ITAT was designed as
a two-tier test and students were instructed to respond by checking the
answer they thought was correct on the multiple-choice part of the test,
and explain their reasoning on the second tier. Responses and
explanations, if both had the reasoning of the impetus theory, were coded
as “1”, for a possible total of five points. All other alternatives were coded
as “0”. Our interest in this part of the study was to determine
whether the possible relationship between FI and FD students in their
degree of applying the impetus theory depended upon the methodol-
ogy used to assess the application of the naïve impetus theory. In
order to accomplish this task, students’ answers were recorded only
by evaluating the multiple-choice part of the ITAT. The same scoring
principle was used.
Students’ ITAT scores based on only the multiple-choice part were
analyzed to compare the groups’ (FD and FI) responses and mean scores
for the degree to which students applied the naïve impetus theory.
ANOVA techniques were used to determine if the mean scores of the
groups differed statistically. Summary and descriptive statistics for these
analyses are found in Tables 3 and 4, while the ANOVA table for the
ITAT mean scores by cognitive style is shown in Table 5.
The analyses on only the multiple-choice part of the two-tier ITAT
showed that, overall, 70 % of the students applied the naïve impetus
theory. Overall, 77 % of FD students applied the naïve impetus theory,
whereas this percentage dropped to 62 % for FI students. The effects of
FD and FI cognitive styles on students’ mean scores in their degree of
applying the naïve impetus theory were also examined (Table 4). The FD
students’ mean score for the ITAT was 3.84 with a standard deviation of
TABLE 5
ANOVA table for ITAT mean scores by cognitive style
Test SS df MS F P value
ITAT two-tier Between groups 15.34 1 14.35 6.95 0.00*
Within groups 220.8 107 2.1
Total 235.2 108
ITAT multiple choice Between groups 15.3 1 15.3 7.5 0.00*
Within groups 219.3 107 2.0
Total 234.6 108
*P G 0.01
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1.2. The FI students’ mean score was 3.11 with a standard deviation of
1.5. The results from the ANOVA presented in Table 5 indicated that
there was a statistically significant difference between FD and FI students
in the degree of applying the impetus theory in favor of FI students.
Results on Research Question 3
The interaction effect between assessment techniques and cognitive styles
of students in their degree of applying the naïve impetus belief were
examined. Repeated measures ANOVA techniques were used to
determine if there was a statistically significant interaction effect between
test technique and cognitive styles on mean scores of the groups. A
summary of the statistics and an ANOVA table for this analysis are found
in Tables 4 and 6, respectively.
Results of analyses show that there was not a statistically significant
interaction effect between assessment techniques and cognitive styles of
students in their degree of applying the naïve impetus belief. For both test
techniques, the FD students’ mean score was higher than the FI students’
mean score.
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
The first aim of this study was to identify if there was a difference
between field dependent and field independent students in the degree they
applied the naïve impetus theory, by utilizing a two-tier test. In order to
accomplish the task, the ITAT was adapted from the widely used tests
FCI and MBT. The findings of this research showed that there exists a
statistically significant difference between the groups in their degree of
applying the naïve impetus theory in favor of FI students. The second aim
of this study was to identify if there was a difference between field
dependent and field independent students in the degree they applied the
naïve impetus theory by assessing multiple-choice test techniques. The
TABLE 6
ANOVA table for ITAT mean scores by test techniques and cognitive styles
Source SS df MS F P value
Factor 1 (two-tier × multiple choice) 33.16 1 33.16 90.13 0.00
Factor 1 × cognitive style 0.008 1 0.01 0.02 0.88
Error factor 1 39.35 107 0.37
EFFECTS OF COGNITIVE STYLES ON NAÏVE IMPETUS THEORY
findings of this study also showed that there is a statistically significant
difference between FD and FI students’ levels of applying the naïve
impetus theory in favor of FI students.
The results indicated that FI students performed significantly better than
FD students in both assessment techniques. These results are consistent with
previous research conducted on determining the relationship between
physics achievement and cognitive styles which indicated that FI students
score equally or higher than FD students in most of the academic fields. For
example, Ziane (1996) found that the cognitive styles of students played an
essential role in students’ physics success, and FI physics students obtained
higher scores in solving physics problems than those students who were
classified as FD. While Ates & Cataloglu (2007a) investigated the possible
relationship between students’ FI/FD cognitive styles, conceptual under-
standings, and problem-solving skills in the area of force and motion, they
found a statistically significant relationship between cognitive style and
students’ physics achievements in favor of FI students.
One plausible explanation on why FI students tend to score higher than
FD students is that when field dependents are confronted with problems,
they find it difficult to locate the relevant information they are seeking
because other information tends to mask what they are looking for
(Jonassen & Grabowski, 1993). On the other hand, typical end-of-chapter
problems and/or achievement tests require problem-solving strategies that
most often involve the differentiation between relevant and irrelevant
information which FD students lack.
The third aim of this study was to examine a possible interaction effect
between assessment techniques and cognitive styles of students in their
degree of applying the naïve impetus theory. The findings of this research
showed that there were no statistically significant interaction effects between
students’ cognitive styles and the format of the assessment technique (i.e.
multiple-choice versus two-tier assessment) used to determine the degree of
applying the impetus theory. For both assessment techniques, there existed a
statistically significant difference between the groups in their degree of
applying the naïve impetus theory in favor of FI students.
However, when the combined data (i.e. qualitative understanding and
verbal explanations) of the two-tier-type diagnostic test were further
analyzed regarding the possible relationship between students’ conceptual
understanding and their cognitive styles, we found the following results.
While the gap between FI and FD students’ scores reflecting the degree of
applying the naïve impetus theory remained constant, the degree of
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applying the impetus theory increased by about 15 % percent for both
cognitive styles. That is, the two-tier test scores for both groups showed
an increase in alternative conceptions regarding the impetus theory. As a
result, assessing student’s alternative conceptions regarding the impetus
theory only through a multiple-choice type test tended to inflate students’
test scores regardless of their cognitive styles. Therefore, for both groups,
a more precise picture regarding the true nature of students’ alternative
conceptions was achieved through a two-tier-type test.
SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS
Our results are in general agreement with previous published research
on the relationship between students’ cognitive styles and their
achievements. We found that FI students in general outperformed
FD students with respect to applying scientific explanations on an
object’s movement. However, it should be stressed that a significant
percentage of students in both groups still exhibited the native
impetus theory while explaining the movement of an object or the
reason for its sustainability of movement.
We found that when the students were given the opportunity to explain
their reasoning for their answers, such as in a two-tier-type test, the overall
percentage of students’ scores dropped by about 15 % when compared to
multiple-choice test scores only. This result supports the previously
raised concerns and limitations of a multiple-choice test when utilized
in assessing students’ cognitive understanding (Treagust, 1986; Odom
& Barrow, 1995). An interesting finding is that the test score gap
between FI and FD students remained almost constant regardless of
the testing instruments utilized in this study. More studies including
different types of testing instruments need to be conducted to get a
better understanding of the nature of cognitive styles and their
possible relation to students’ alternative conceptions.
One major limitation of our study could be contributed to by its
teaching methods. The second major limitation of this study was the
composition of the sample. The students involved in the study were
predominantly female students. Hence, a similar study should be
conducted with a more balanced gender distribution and be looking for
the relationship between FI and FD students as it relates to applying the
native impetus theory.
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APPENDIX
The Impetus Theory Application Test (ITAT)
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